



“SARS in the City”: the Toronto experience


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Associate Medical Officer of Health

Toronto Public Health

PHIN, Atlanta 24 May 2004





What is SARS?


- Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
- Symptoms include:
 - *a fever of more than 38 degrees C (100.4 degrees F)*
 - *muscle aches, severe fatigue, severe headache*
 - *dry cough, shortness of breath*
 - *positive chest x-ray*

Where it began..

- 21 February, 2003 a Chinese Doctor from Guandong checks into room 911 at the Metropole hotel....




Guangdong Province



Christian et al.
Submitted to
CID October
2003

A Brief Chronology

- Toronto's first SARS case reported as possible TB on March 9
- WHO alert of “atypical pneumonia” March 12
- First case in hospital dies March 13; 4 family members admitted with illness
- Joint press conference March 14
- Illness in hospital workers March 21
- Made a reportable disease March 24, 2003
- Designated ‘Communicable and virulent’



A Brief Chronology

- Establishment of “SARS” ward March 23
- Closing of index hospital March 25
- Provincial health emergency declared Mar 26
- Provincial leadership and first infection control directives to hospitals, LTCF, MD’s, CHC’s...March 27; formation of “Science Committee”
- Closing of second hospital March 28
- Cluster of cases in ‘protected’ workers April 16
- WHO travel advisory April 23-29

A Brief Chronology

- Outbreak thought to be over May 16
- “New Normal” directives issued
- Unrecognized cases and spread in a new hospital May 23
- Phase 2 limited to hospital patients, HCWs and visitors
- Last case ill June 12, 2003

A Brief Chronology

- Phase 1: Mar 13 - Apr 20
- Phase 2: May 20 - Jun 24
- 438 cases across Canada (225 in Toronto)
 - 44 deaths (38 in Toronto)
 - 222 hospitalized, 50 in Intensive Care Units
 - 50% in health care workers (4 deaths)
 - cluster of 31 cases associated with a religious group
 - no significant community spread

Figure 1: Toronto SARS Cases* Contacts Requiring Quarantine†





Figure 2. Cases investigated for SARS and contacts identified as requiring quarantine




Epidemiology

- Average incubation period 4.7 days (range 1-12)
- 66% of cases were female
- Average age of those who died 71 (39-100)
- Only 3 deaths in persons less than 50
- Mean time from onset of symptoms to death 19 days (1-43)

What was the role of TPH?

- Investigation of possible cases
- Quarantine of close contacts
- Isolation orders if necessary
- Health risk assessment and communication
- Disease surveillance and reporting
- Managing community relations

Incident Command Structure



Workload Indicators

- 316,615 calls to Hotline, daily peak of 47,567
- 2,132 case investigations (av. 9 hours each), all extremely time sensitive
- 199 Probable Cases and 26 Suspect Cases
- 23,103 contacts followed up, 13,374 in quarantine
- 27 isolation orders issued under the HPPA
- acute event lasted 14 weeks

Staffing

- Up to 400 staff on duty each day
- 700 staff assigned full-time
- 2 shifts per day (8 a.m.-11 p.m.), 7 days/week
- Active assistance from Province
- Many others came to help:
 - *Other public health units*
 - *Community Medicine Specialists*
 - *Health Canada*
 - *Department of National Defence*

Intense Media Interest

- 2nd only to Iraq War
- Daily media briefings, televised live
- Over 1,200 media calls in the first 8 weeks
- Daily print/electronic, local/ethnic, international
- Multiple spokespersons, many opinions...



Communication Methods

- Fact sheets for different audiences
- Quarantine directives for affected groups
- Print/web material translated into 14 languages
- Diverse language skills among Hotline staff plus AT&T translation service
- Train-the-trainer sessions for community agencies
- Local community meetings - health risks, ethnic discrimination
- Standard letters to conference planners
- Shared hard drive for common protocols, etc.

Case Contact Management System

- Required for both case & contact management plus analysis of data
- Extremely high volumes of work requiring very fast turn around time
- Improved quality control
- Planned & designed as an interim solution

The screenshot displays the 'SARS - Case Details' application window. The title bar indicates the case ID is 13, type is 'Under investigation', and the patient is K K 1953/05/27. The window is divided into several tabs: General, Clinical Info, Clinical Info (cont), Exposure History, Exposure History (cont), Follow Up, and Clinical Severity. The 'General' tab is active, showing patient information fields such as Last Name (K), First Name (K), AKA (KK), DOB (1953/05/27), Gender (M), and Occupation. It also includes fields for House Number, Street (Main), City (Toronto), Postal Code (M1E 3K6), Home Phone (4165558855), Work Phone (4165558877), and Other Phone (416888-9922). The 'HU Information' section shows HU Reporting the case (Toronto), HU of Residence (Toronto), Report Date (2003/06/05), Interviewer (Judy), Phone (82670), Province (Ontario), and Human Case (Yes). A table at the bottom lists the initial case type, with one entry: 'Under invest' with Onset Date 2003/03/03, Created Date 2003/06/25, Created By itemple, and Modified 2003/06/25. The window also features a 'Comments' field with the text 'This is a busy case' and a status bar at the bottom showing the Start menu, GroupWise - Mailbox, Exploring - CCMS Requi..., Microsoft PowerPoint - L..., SARS Training (v. 2003..., and the system clock at 4:00 PM.

Case Type	Onset Date	Comments	Created Date	Created By	Modified
Under invest	2003/03/03		2003/06/25	itemple	2003/06/25

System Strengths & ...

- Unlimited number of users
- User friendly system
- Incorporates quarantine requirements
- Enables user to manage large volumes of data
- Incorporates QA requirements

...Limitations

- Currently limited to City of Toronto
- Planned as an interim solution, requirements gathering and testing were rushed
- Case management component more complex resulting in challenges in extracting epi data for analysis

PowerCase

- Case management intervention system developed for the Community
- Under a new management arrangement the PowerCase system gained OPP designation and brought in to assist with the implementation in a new setting


How Did TPH Get Into Exploring PowerCase?

In the SARS outbreak:

- traditional process of epidemiological linkage being used to establish epidemiological linkages
- epidemiological linkage with data management and analysis



PowerCase



Stakeholder Communications

- Within TPH
- Other City departments, TEMS, police and fire
- Unions, joint health & safety committees
- Health facilities and service providers
- Workplaces, schools/school boards
- Jails, homeless shelters & advocates
- Churches, religious leaders, community groups
- Conference planners & associations
- Other levels of government



Occupational Health & Safety Issues

- Created a special Family Health team for home visits of clients in quarantine
- Respiratory / contact protection for TPH staff in hospitals
- Some City staff quarantined due to occupational exposure to SARS
- Psychosocial impacts across the board - fear, grief, stress, exhaustion
- Positive sense of contribution and teamwork

Protective Barriers: N95 masks, face shields, gown and gloves





Community Impacts from SARS

- Widespread program cancellations (public health, hospital, long term care, community services)
- Psychological isolation among patients, health care workers and quarantined contacts
- Economic hardship for hospitality / tourism industries and Chinese businesses
- Academic impact on students in affected schools and universities



Outbreak Control

How do you stop an outbreak when:

- Agent is unknown
- Incubation period uncertain
- Mode of transmission not entirely clear
- No diagnostic test
- No prophylaxis
- No vaccine
- No treatment

R_0 = population density x infectivity x time

Isolation/Quarantine

- Quarantine
 - not used > 50 years in Canada
 - “invented” work quarantine
- Used combination of
 - quarantine/work quarantine with daily or twice daily assessment
 - active surveillance with daily assessment
 - self-monitoring with periodic follow-up
 - day 10 follow-up and counselling

Isolation/Quarantine

- Linkage of symptomatic contacts to assessment centres
- “Voluntary” quarantine - issues
- Issued 27 Section 22 orders under HPPA
- Challenges of determining if someone is at home by phone e.g. cell phones, internet, lack of phone
- Government financial support
- Very difficult mentally, physically, emotionally and financially

Isolation/Quarantine

- Resources & psychosocial support to individuals/communities who were quarantined
 - One-on-one support by telephone through hotline (staffed by PHNs and Mental Health team) and group teleconferences
 - Partnerships e.g.:
 - police - spot checks, serve orders
 - Emergency Medical Services
 - linked with Red Cross and Salvation Army to provide masks, thermometers, food, etc.

Isolation/Quarantine

- Homeless/shelter population
 - worked with shelters on screening
 - had only 6-8 quarantine beds
- Jails/schools/workplaces/transit
 - need for support, risk assessment, contingency planning, etc.

Isolation/Quarantine

- Community Issues
 - Post-quarantine acceptance back into schools and workplaces
 - Stigmatization of affected groups e.g. Chinese community
 - Acknowledge and deal with discrimination - worked with community leaders
 - Address anxiety or fear

Isolation/Quarantine

- Legal Issues/Challenges
 - Issued 27 orders under Section 22 of Health Protection and Promotion Act, no orders under section 35
 - One appeal; withdrawn
 - Designated ‘communicable and virulent’
 - Group orders
 - Able to detain at facility other than hospital

Lessons from SARS

- Existing programs and relationships are what work
- Communication is key
- The big risk is unrecognized patients
 - Patients and visitors get sick as well as HCWs
- SARS transmission is primarily droplet
 - Some situations are higher risk than other
- It is easier to control disease than fear
 - Science/content expertise gets lost in politics



**CANADA'S
WORST
NIGHTMARE...**

NEASE, '03



**- A MAD COW
IN A SARS
MASK BEING
BITTEN BY
A WEST NILE
MOSQUITO.**